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THE ADMISSIBILITY AND SCOPE OF GUILTY PLEAS IN
ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
0 treble woe
Fall ten times treble on 'that cursed head.
Hamlet, Act V, Scene I.
IN entering pleas of guilty . . . Westinghouse wishes to make it clear
that it does not hereby admit the allegations of those indictments .... 1
In this spirit, eighteen electrical manufacturing corporations pleaded guilty
in December 1960 2 to charges of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.3
No plea of guilty had ever before been entered by a corporate defendant in a
major criminal antitrust prosecution 4 because nolo contendere, which admits
guilt solely for the purposes of entering judgment, was generally available.
But in the electrical cases, the court had responded to the government
request to reject nolo pleas and required defendants either to plead guilty or
go to trial. Subsequently, many private actions claiming treble damages for
1. Transcript of Discussion on Rearraignment and Entry of Nolo Contendere Pleas, p.
395 (on file in Yale Law Library). United States v. General Elec. Co., TRADE REG. R'.
(1960 Trade Cas.) f 69699 E.D. Pa., May 13, 1960 summarizes the hearings.
2. Most of the pleas were entered December 8, 1960, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The indictments covered 20 products, and
charged 29 corporations and 45 individual defendants. See generally, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,
1960, p. 1, col. 5 The eighteen corporations which pleaded guilty to at least one of the
indictments are: Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.;
General Electric Co.; McGraw, Edison Co.; Maloney Electric Co.; Wagner Electric
Corp.; Federal-Pacific Co.; The Clark Controller Co.; Cutler-Hammer, Inc.; Southern
States Equipment Corporation; Foster Wheeler Corp.; Ingersoll Rand Co.; C.H. Wheeler
Manufacturing Co.; Worthington, Corp.; I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co.; Allen-Bradley Co.;
Square-D Co.; H.K. Porter Co.
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4. HADLIcK, CRIINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE SHEIMAN ANTI-TRusT ACT App.
A (1939), collects case histories before 1939. A search through the Trade Regulations Re-
porter covering the past two decades revealed no significant case in which guilty was the
plea.
5. In 1953, the justice Department reversed its prior practice and announced a general
policy of opposing nolo pleas because of their limited usefulness in subsequent litigation and
their moral ambiguity in areas of flagrant violation where lines of guilt should be clearly
drawn. See Memorandum to United States Attorneys from the Attorney General, quoted
in United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1954) :
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for federal law enforcement
in recent times has been the practice of permitting ... the plea of nolo contendere.
... Uncontrolled use of the plea has led to shockingly low sentences and insignifi-
cant fines which are no deterrent to crime. As a practical matter is accomplishes little
that is useful .... Moreover, a person permitted to plead nolo contendere admits
guilt for the purpose of imposing punishment for his acts and yet, for all other
purposes, and as far as the public is concerned, persists in the denial of wrongdoing.
It is no wonder that the public regards consent to such a plea by the Government as
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injuries resulting from the conspiratorial acts involved in the Sherman Act
cases have been filed against these manufacturers.6 A major issue before the
courts which try the private suits in the coming years will be what effect a
guilty plea in a criminal case should have in third party litigation.
One theory on which a third party plaintiff may rely in tendering the de-
fendant's guilty plea is that section 5 of the Clayton Act 7 specifically authorizes
the introduction of government-obtained judgments as prima facie evidence in
treble damage suits. Section 5 declares that:
A final judgment or decree... rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws...
shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or pro-
ceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said
lawss... as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto.
But a proviso states that "This section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken." The crucial question is
an admission that it has only a technical case at most and that the whole proceeding
was just a fiasco....
Accordingly,... you are instructed not to consent to it except in the most unusual
circumstances and then only after your recommendation for doing so has been re-
viewed and approved by the Assistant Attorney General responsible or by my
Office....
Compare the statement of Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks in the electrical cases:
.... [W] e should urge this court to exercise its discretion in these cases against
the acceptance of these nolo pleas. This position ... is based solely on the serious-
ness of the crimes these indictments charge ....
Our position is that public interest in effective law enforcement, in deterring
the occurrence of like flagrancies in the future by these defendants and others...
suggests refusal on the part of this court to accept nolo pleas.
United States v. General Electric Co., TRADn RE(. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69699
E.D. Pa., May 13, 1960. Though the policy of contesting nolo was followed in the
antitrust field, Hansen, The Current Federal Policy in Antitrust Matters, 4 ANTIRausT
BULL. 541, 554 (1959), the courts have been largely unimpressed by the arguments and
have allowed nolo pleas despite government objections. See, e.g., United States v. Safeway
Stores, 20 F.R.D. 451 N.D. Tex. (1957). But cfi. United States v. Standard Ultramarine &
Color Co., 137 F. Supp: 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Two unusual steps were taken to gain guilty pleas in the electrical cases. The head of the
antitrust division came in person to argue at the hearings contesting the nolo pleas and he
brought with him a letter from the Attorney General of the United States arguing that the
future of criminal antitrust enforcement would suffer greatly if nolo were allowed in these
cases of blatant violations. See note 1 supra.
6. Third parties may sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) superseding similar provisions in the Sherman Act,
26 Stat. 210 (1890) and 28 Stat. 570 (1894). It is estimated that over 200 such suits have
already been filed, this representing but a fraction of the potential litigation. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 1, col.1 reporting the filing by 44 utility companies of actions asking
over $1 billion in triple damages.
7. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958).
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whether the proviso embraces a plea of guilty. Both legislative history and
logical statutory construction indicate that a guilty plea falls within the pro-
viso and is therefore outside the scope of the section.
Prior to the enactment of section 5, third parties could not introduce
government-obtained judgments as proof of the facts upon which they were
based." In response to President Wilson's observation that it was "not fair
that the private litigants should be obliged to set up and establish again the
facts which the Government has proved," legislation was introduced.9 The
original House bill made judgments in equity both admissible and conclusive
in subsequent third party proceedings. 10 In the Senate, admissibility was ex-
panded to cover judgments in criminal proceedings as well as decrees in equity,
but all judgments were reduced from conclusive to prima facie evidence. 1
Not until the House and Senate bills were referred to a Conference Committee
was the proviso added.
The questions and discussion on the floor of Congress following the in-
troduction of the Conference Committee bill in both houses clearly indicate
that the purpose of the proviso was to induce defendants to capitulate to
government demands. 1 2 As one member of the Committee explained:
[T]he prima facie effect shall not apply to consent judgments... before
any evidence is introduced .... If the Government brings a suit against a
trust ... and it surrenders, we eliminate the effect of the "prima facie"judgment. If it fights and loses then the prima facie effect is given .... 13
Though the proviso speaks of "consent judgments or decrees," the phrase was
manifestly intended to cover criminal as well as civil judgments. Several
Senators opposed the proviso precisely because it would include guilty pleas,
thereby exempting them from the section's effect:
When the charges are contested there may be some honest doubt as to
whether the defendant trust is guilty: but when the Government com-
8. Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918) (government
judgment rendered prior to passage of § 5 held inadmissible).
The majority rule still holds judgments in former criminal cases unavailable in a civil
proceeding as proof of facts upon which the judgments were based. See cases collected in
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951). But there is a trend, in light of the greater burden of proof
successfully borne in the criminal case, to accord the prior litigation some evidentiary
weight. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.
1941) describes the trend, citing cases, in an addendum to the opinion at 411. See also ex-
cellent Note, 50 YALE L.J. 499 (1940). Even cases allowing the use of former litigation as
proof of facts, however, fall into a pattern where overriding policy considerations persuade
the court to ignore both the lack of mutality and the fact of different parties in each action.
See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942) (beneficiary of insurance
policy not allowed to profit from his crime).
9. 51 CONG. REc. 1964 (1914).
10. Id. at 9487.
11. Id. at 13898.
12. See, e.g., id. 15823-25, 16046-47.
13. Id. at 16276.
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mences a prosecution against a great trust ... and they.. come into
court and plead guilty, is there any doubt of their guilt?
Then why should consent judgments be excluded? 14
These debates on the final bill make clear what was true from the beginning:
that Congress had conceived section 5 primarily to relieve third party plaintiffs
from the unfairness and waste which had resulted from the necessity of relitigat-
ing issues already adjudicated by an expensive trial. 15 This being so, the ad-
dition of the proviso was not inconsistent with the congressional purpose.
And, the proviso gave the government a useful tool with which to induce
compromise. 10 It was hoped that defendants fearing future damage actions
would waive trial on the government charges in order to deprive third party
plaintiffs of the benefit of section 5Y
Despite the legislative history, it might be argued that the language of the
proviso in its natural meaning applies only to civil proceedings. "Consent
judgments or decrees" are both common in civil proceedings, but the termin-
ology is anomalous in the criminal context.'8 Another proviso 19 to section 5,
14. Id. at 16046.
15. Typical of the approach taken even by advocates of aid to third-party litigants
is Senator Walsh's comment during the debates on the original Senate bill:
If the United States shall proceed against any organization ...and eventually,
after a judicial proceeding going through all the Courts, it shall be determined and
decided that the organization is a combination in violation of the Sherman Act, that
judgment ... can be availed of by anybody .... The party seeking to take advantage
of it will not be ob!iged to retravel again, step by step, over the entire field which it
arrived .... In other words, we give to the private individual the benefit which
accrues by reason of the long litigation pursued by the Government in endeavoring
to secure the judgment.
51 CoNG. REc. 13851 (1914). (Emphasis added.)
16. In order to eliminate the cumbersome, dilatory and expensive trials which had
bogged down the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, it is expressly provided that a
consent judgment entered before any testimony is taken is not to be thus available as
prima facie evidence. Thereby, it was hoped that defendants would be persuaded to
settle their difficulties out of court on a basis protecting the public interest and yet
without draining the scant funds and personnel available for anti-trust work.
Timberg, The Anti-trust Laws from the Point of View of a Government Attorney,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 38 (1949).
17. Arguments by counsel in United States v. Safeway Stores, TRADE REG. RE'.
(1957 Trade Cas.) ff 68770 (July 26, 1957), typical of those in other such cases, see, e.g.,
United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., id. f1 68713, indicate that fear of treble damage actions
s a major consideration to defendants in pleading. Bicks, The Department of Justice and
rivate Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTrrRuST BULL. 8 (1959) : "The threat of subsequent
)rivate litigation may well be a major consideration prompting defendants to enter into
:onsent decrees." See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061 n.334 (1952).
18. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 173
:S.D.N.Y. 1955). "[N]o criminal would ever consent that a judgment be entered against
iim when he pleads guilty." 51 CONG. REc. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh about
he Proviso).
Lenvin and Meyers, Nola Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J. 1255,
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however, militates against such a literal reading by demonstrating that
Congress in 1914 used the term "consent judgment or decrees" to refer both
to criminal and equitable proceedings. This proviso declares that section 5
"shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees rendered in criminal pro-
ceedings, or suits in equity now pending 20 . . . ." Fortifying this argument
is the consistent action of courts in applying the language of the first proviso
to one type of criminal consent judgment, that entered following a plea of
nolo contendere.2 1 The rationale is that such judgments are entered before
testimony is taken, signifying capitulation, and therefore constitute "consent
judgments." 22 Since these characteristics are as typical of guilty pleas 2 as of
nolo pleas and since the judgment entered following a nolo plea is identical
to that following a guilty plea,24 there is no reason to distinguish them for the
purpose of the proviso.
Even though the proviso forecloses efforts to introduce a plea of guilty as
prima facie evidence under section 5 of the Clayton Act, the plea may be
1267 n.68 (1942) cites a statement by Judge Bard, in sentencing defendants in United States
v. American Waxed Paper Ass'n (E.D. Pa. 1942) that there is no such thing as a consent
judgment in a criminal action.
19. Provided, further, this Section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
rendered in criminal proceedings, or suits in equity now pending in which the taking
of testimony has been commenced but has not been concluded, provided such judg-
ments or decrees are rendered before any further testimony is taken.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
20. The argument, of course, may cut the other way: when Congress intended to refer
to consent judgments in criminal proceedings, it did so specifically. Though persuasive, this
construction must give way to the combination against it of legislative history and purpose
as well as judicial interpretation. See text at notes 21-23 infra.
21. See Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd,
119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
22. 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939). A second ground for the decision was that izolo
contendere does not create an "estoppel as between the parties" to the Government action.
Twin Ports is most often cited, however, for holding that nolo is a consent decree. See,
e.g., Barnsdell Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940).
23. See ibid. Throughout Twin Ports, Judge Nordbye gratuitously considers guilty
pleas and finds that they have exactly the same effect as nolo contendere under the Proviso.
The effective marshalling of legislative history in the lengthy opinion makes it persuasive
dicta on the effect of the guilty plea. But cf. United States v. Standard Utramarine &
Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) in which Judge Weinfeld viewed aid to the
treble-damage litigant as the overriding legislative concern of section 5 and inferred from
this that third parties should not be denied the use of guilty pleas by classifying them as
"consent judgments." This analysis is as much dicta as that in Twin Ports since Judge
Weinfeld was merely deciding whether to accept a nolo contendere plea; there was no
question of the defendant's pleading guilty. But the finding that the section's major pur-
pose is aid to treble-damage litigants and that the proviso must be construed in that light,
is a construct of the decision.
24. United States v. Reisfield, 188 F. Supp. 631 (D. Md. 1960) indicates that in the
majority of cases even the same printed forms are used for judgments on guilty and noto
pleas. Here, the court accedes to defendant's request to vary the printed form somewhat but
admits no substantial difference between the two judgments,
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admissible under the common law admission exception to the hearsay rule.25
Under present rules of evidence, guilty pleas introduced by third parties
constitute "some evidence" of the matter deemed to be covered by the plea.2 6
Courts universally entertain defense evidence explaining or contradicting
the implications of such pleas, 27 but the plea alone may be sufficient to carry
an issue to the trier of fact.28
It may be objected, therefore, that admitting a guilty plea into evidence as
a common law admission would for all practical purposes make prima facie evi-
dence out of a judgment which is protected from such effect by the proviso to sec-
tion 5.29 Admitting such a plea, the argument would continue, implies that Con-
gress went through the empty motions of protecting from the prima facie effect of
section 5 certain judgments which would have exactly the same weight if left to
operate outside of the section. But the major assumption underlying this argu-
ment-that the congressmen who enacted section 5 believed that a common
law admission constituted prima facie evidence-may be unwarranted. Many
of the evidence treatises current in 1914 omit any consideration of the effect
to be given a guilty plea when introduced by a third party in a subsequent
civil suit.30 Wigmore's first edition,3' published in 1904, classified a guilty
plea as a "quasi-admission," 32 generally admissible to demonstrate only that
an opponent had previously contradicted his present claim. To be considered
"affirmative testimony," states the treatise, the plea must have been against
interest at the time it was made.33 Nowhere is "affirmative testimony"equated
with prima facie evidence. In fact, the treatise refers to a quasi-admission
merely as an "item in the mass of evidence."3 4 Moreover, extensive case law
on the use of guilty pleas was not available. The only significant case cited
25. WIGVORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 815, 1066, 1067 (3d ed. 1940).
26. See cases collected in Annot., 31 A.L.R. 278 (1924), Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1307
(1951)
27. See, e.g., Race v. Chappell, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W.2d 626 (1947); Greenfield v.
Tuccillo, 129 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942); Gillespie v. Modern Woodmen, 101 W. Va. 602,
133 S.E. 333 (1926).
28. In case they were made understandingly and deliberately, are of pure fact within
the knowledge of the declarant and were made under conditions and circumstances
conductive to veracity and are not overborne by the other facts in evidence they may
establish a cause of action ....
Gangi v. Fradus, 227 N.Y. 452, 457, 125 N.E. 677, 679 (1920), quoted in Bruce v. McClure,
220 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1955). The Court here is speaking of admissions generally, but what
it says is especially true of guilty pleas. For holding to same effect, see Leusink v. O'Don-
nell, 257 Wisc. 571,44 N.W.2d 525.
29. Prima facie simply means that the evidence has sufficient weight if not rebutted to
establish the fact for which it is offered. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
30. See, e.g., BEST, EVIDENCE (1911); ELLxorr, EVIDENCE (1904); HUGHES, Evi-
DEN cE (1907) ; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 575 n.1 (1842).
31. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1904).
32. Id. § 815.
33. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (1904).
34. Id. § 1057.
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by Wigmore allowed the former guilty plea as evidence but did not permit
the jury to know the allegations of the indictment to which the plea had been
directed, and did not employ the phrase "prima facie evidence." 35 Thus, Con-
gress might well have believed that a plea of guilty, although admissible under
common law rules, was not given prima facie effect by contemporary courts. It
is reasonable to assume that Congress enacted section 5 to give prima facie
effect to certain judgments which did not have such weight at common law,
and that by exempting other judgments from its coverage, Congress intended
to leave their admissibility and weight to the development of the common
law.8 6 That present courts apparently give common law admissions prima
facie effect is irrelevant in determining the intent of Congress in 1914.37
Colloquy during the debates supports this reading of the statute. Senator
Norris, for example, made the following comment:
• . .[N]otwithstanding the Proviso, which says that the section shall not
apply to certain cases, suppose that in all other respects, it was proper to
offer a judgment in evidence and there was no reason why it should not
be admitted, assuming that in other respects the judgment is proper
evidence, then this Proviso would not exclude it as I understand.38
35. Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wisc. 67 (1855).
36. The language of the proviso supports two further arguments for the admissibility
of the pleas as common law admissions. The proviso states that "this section shall not apply
to consent judgments" (emphasis added), not, as it easily could have, that consent judg-
ments shall be exempted from evidentiary use in subsequent litigation. Secondly, the
proviso refers only to judgments whereas pleas, not judgments, are common-law ad-
missions, since the admission-emphasis is on the defendant's voluntary statement. See note
71 infra.
37. The current Wigmore (1940 ed.) devotes little more space to guilty pleas as ad-
missions than the 1904 edition. See note 24 supra. But the footnotes collect considerably
more cases in which the holdings are uniform on the effect of the pleas.
38. 51 CONG. REc. 15939 (1914).
Senator Nelson was speaking against the Proviso when Senator Norris asked:
Does not the Senator think, notwithstanding the Proviso ... that the judgments
... could be offered and would be proper evidence, although it might not establish a
prima facie case.
Nelson: I do not think so unless the parties should be the same.
Norris: ... (I)t would not necessarily follow that on account of the Proviso a
judgment. .. could not be offered as evidence if it were otherwise admissible.
Nelson: The effect of the judgment would not be restricted under the general
law; but the Senator who himself has been a judge knows very well that where there
is not an identity of parties, the judgment could not be used.
Norris: ... I do not think the Senator gets my idea .... Notwithstanding the
Proviso, which says that the section shall not apply to certain cases, suppose that in
all other respects, it was proper to offer a judgment in evidence and there was no
reason why it should not be admitted, assuming that in other respects the judg-
ment is proper evidence, then this Proviso would not exclude it as I understand.
Nelson: No.
But cf. an earlier comment by another Senator which suggested that the Proviso
destroyed all evidential weight for the guilty pleas:
You have got no more right to destroy the evidentiary value of a plea of guilty in a
[Vol. 71 :684
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A number of court of appeals decisions also support this reading by implicit-
ly holding that section 5 does not regulate the entire area of admissibility of
judgments in antitrust cases, and thus that judgments specifically exempted
from the section may nevertheless have some evidentiary weight. In Pfotzer
v. Aqua Systems Inc.,39 the Second Circuit was squarely confronted with the
contention that the proviso to section 5 prevented any subsequent use of
consent judgments;40 the contention was necessarily rejected by the court's
holding that evidence of a prior plea of nolo contendere was admissible to
impeach a witness. In Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelnman,41 the Third Circuit ad-
mitted a consent decree which was within the language of the proviso as
some evidence of defendants' attitude toward a specific industry practice.
The court noted that the "consent decree was not . . . prima facie evidence
... but was simply admitted as a fact in showing the activity of the defendants
to prevent double featuring...."4
Once a court has decided that a plea of guilty should be admissible as a
common law admission, it faces the problem of what group of facts the plea
should be deemed to have admitted. A defendant who pleads guilty is usually
held to have admitted only the essential elements of the offense charged. 43 The
trust case than in the case of an embezzler or murderer. The evidence in either case
can be used without any statute .... This right you have sought to take away in
trust suits ....
51 CONG. REc. 15939.
39. 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
40. Brief for Appellees, pp. 32-34, Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1947).
41. 95 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1938).
42. Id. at 146. Milgrim v. Loews, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951) also indicates that
§ 5 does not cover the field of the admission of former judgments in antitrust cases. The
Third circuit here permitted a prior judgment to be used as evidence of a "proclivity" to
violate antitrust laws after apparently finding the judgment inadmissible under § 5. Id. at
594 n.5 (dissent). One of the objections in the vehement dissent was:
... section 5 of the Clayton Act contains a narrow and precisely defined authoriza-
tion to use a judgment or decree rendered in a public suit .... This statute would
have been unnecessary if without legislation courts were authorized to make the
present far broader use of prior wrongdoing.
United States v. Lake Asphalt and Petroleum Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.)
69835 (D. Mass. Nov. 11, 1960) adds a further fillip to the whole issue of section 5 regula-
tion of the admissibility of prior anti-trust judgments. In this case the Government engi-
neered a compromise in which defendants were allowed to enter nolo contendere pleas
without government protest, but the judgment contained an injunction restraining the
defendant from denying prima facie effect in subsequent suits against it by Massachusetts
and its political subdivisions. Effectively, judgment on a nolo contendere plea was potential-
ly given section 5 effect though congressional intent and judicial interpretation had agreed
that such pleas should fall within the proviso. In view of a court's allowance of this pro-
cedure, it becomes difficult to argue any absoluteness for the language of section 5. See
generally McHenry, The Asphalt Clause-A Trap for the Unwary, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1114
(1961).
43. See, e.g., Hawley v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1947).
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difficulty, especially in conspiracy cases, lies in determining which of the
facts alleged in the indictment are "essential." The antitrust indictments
lodged against defendants in the recent General Electric case illustrate the
difficulty and the importance of this question.44
Paragraph 9 of the indictment in case No. 20235 charged that since 1951
defendants have "engaged in a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable
restraint of the . .. interstate trade and commerce in circuit breakers, in
violation of Section 1 of the ...Sherman Act." Paragraph 10 charged that
"the aforesaid combination and conspiracy has consisted of a continuing
agreement, understanding and concert of action ...the substantial terms of
which have been and are: (a) To fix and maintain prices . . . of circuit
breakers; (b) To allocate among themselves the business of supplying circuit
breakers to Federal, State, and local government agencies; (c) To submit
... rigged bids [for such governmental sales] ; and (d) To submit.., rigged
price quotations . . . [for sales to electric utility companies]." Paragraph 11
charged the defendant with having done a number of carefully detailed things
"for the purpose of forming and effectuating the aforesaid combination and
conspiracy." 45 Final paragraph 12 alleged that as a result of the conspiracy
(a) the prices of circuit breakers had been fixed, (b) competition in the sale
44. United States v. General Elec. Co., Criminal Action No. 20235, filed Feb. 16, 1960,
charging a conspiracy in the trade of circuit breakers against five corporate defendants.
(On file in the Yale Law Library).
45. During the period of time covered by this indictment, the defendants, and other
persons to the grand jurors unknown, for the purpose of forming and effectuating
the aforesaid combination and conspiracy, have done, among other things, the follow-
ing:
(a) Since at least 1951, and continuing until sometime in 1957, representatives of
defendant manufacturers, [naming 4 defendants] conducted frequent meetings.
In 1956 at least nine such meetings were held at hotels in various cities through-
out the country including New York, N.Y., Pittsburgh, Pa., Boston, Mass. and
Philadelphia, Pa.;
(b) The aforesaid meetings were conducted for the purpose of allocating among the
manufacturers sales of circuit breakers to various Federal, State and local
governmental agencies pursuant to sealed bid invitations. The bid invitations





Particular bid invitations were discussed and one of the manufacturers was de-
signated to submit the lowest bid for each invitation ....
(c) From January through October of 1958, representatives of defendant manu-
facturers . . . met periodically in at least seven meetings to discuss increases in
the price levels for circuit breakers...
(d) In the fall of 1958, all of the defendant manufacturers agreed to discontinue the
sale of circuit breakers at the then prevailing lower prices. On or about November
9, 1958, a meeting was held at the Traymore Hotel, Atlantic City, N.J., at which
(Vol. 71:684
GUILTY PLEAS
of circuit breakers suppressed, and (c) purchasers deprived of the benefits of
free competition in circuit breakers.
representatives of all of the defendant manufacturers agreed, among other things,
that :
(1) In the sale of circuit breakers to non-governmental organizations, all of the
defendant manufacturers, except I-T-E Circuit Breaker Company, would
sell circuit breakers at "list" or "book" prices which prices were substantial-
ly identical for all defendant manufacturers;
(2) Representatives of all of the defendant manufacturers would meet periodical-
ly and allocate bids to Federal, State and local governmental agencies,






(e) On or about November 12, 1958, at Atlantic City, N.J., and on or about No-
vember 15, 1958 at Philadelphia, Pa., meetings were held for the purpose of
establishing a systematic procedure for carrying out the agreements reached at
the November 9, 1958 meeting. At these meetings, defendant manufacturers also
agreed that the "list" or "book" price of circuit breakers should not include
certain accessory items, but that additional charges should be made for those
items;
(f) Commencing thereafter, a series of periodic meetings were held throughout the
country, attended by representatives of all of the defendant manufacturers. At
least nine such meetings were held between December 1958 and September 1959
at various cities including Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, Seattle and Denver;
(g) At these periodic meetings, a cumulative list of sealed bid business secured by
all of the defendant manufacturers was circulated, and the representatives
present would compare the relative standing of each company .... The repre-
sentatives present would then discuss particular future bid invitations and
designate which manufacturer should submit the lowest bid therefor;
(h) At these meetings, the manufacturer designated to receive a particular sale
would then declare the price at which it intended to bid. If the designated
manufacturer had not yet computed its bid, its representative would later
notify the other representatives usually by correspondence or telephone, stat-
ing the specific figure which he would quote on the bid invitation and describ-
ing the equipment involved. In the course of these communications, various
procedures were used for the purpose of avoiding detection .... a code number
. . . as the sole identification of the sender or in conjunction with the use of
the first name of its representative;
(i) It has been the normal practice for the designated manufacturer to submit its
bid at a price based upon the "list" or "book" price of the basic circuit breaker
unit involved and for the other defendant manufacturers to submit higher bids
usually by adding additional items in their computations. On various bid in-
vitations, usually involving a relatively small sales value, the defendant manu-
facturers agreed to submit identical bids at "list" or "book" prices; and
(j) Pursuant to these agreements the defendant manufacturers submitted bids in
1958 and 1959 to various Federal, State, and local governmental agencies and
other awarding authorities throughout the United States.
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How much of such an indictment does the guilty plea encompass? Should
the defendant be held to have admitted only that his conduct fell within the
statutory definition of the crime charged? (This would be equivalent to ad-
mitting Paragraph 9 alone.) Or should he be held to have confessed to specific-
ally charged conduct which, as a matter of law, constituted a crime? (This
would be equivalent to admitting participation in a specific type of conspiracy
definable by its purposes as catalogued in Paragraph 10 and perhaps by the
acts performed "for the purpose of forming and effectuating" it as set forth in
Paragraph 11.) Or should he be held to have admitted not only the offense
charged, either in the language of the statute or as defined by the indictment, but
also whatever collateral charges may have been made in the indictment? (This
would be equivalent to admitting the effects of the conspiracy alleged in
Paragraph 12.) The specificity of allegations admitted by a guilty plea greatly
concerns third party plaintiffs seeking to use the plea because treble damage
actions must be grounded on proof of particular conduct which has demonstra-
bly injured the complainant.46
Some indication of the scope the guilty pleas will have as admissions may be
discernible from the extent to which the pleas estop defendants in government
damage actions, 47 which will be litigated before most of the third party treble
damage suits come to trial. In both instances the courts will confront many of the
same difficulties, since basic to both estoppel and common law admissions is the
question: What facts alleged in an indictment were so essential to the crime
charged that they should be considered as admitted in subsequent proceedings
stemming from the same conduct? Thus, the resolution of "essentiality" for
estoppel purposes could influence the later admissive effect of guilty pleas.
The scope of the estoppel created by former criminal judgments is a func-
tion of the judgment, the indictment, and (if there has been a trial) the
evidence and instructions to the jury.48 Only an examination of all such
46. Suckow Borax Mines Consol. Inc. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 185 F2d 196, 208
(9th Cir. 1950). The statute authorizing treble-damage litigation, see note 6 supra, gives
a cause of action to one "injured in his business or property." Thus, it is not enough for
a plaintiff to allege a general violation of the anti-trust laws without demonstrating
specifically how his injury resulted. HADLIcx, TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAws 14-17 (1940). See also, Timberlake, The Use of Government Obtained Judgments or
Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
991, 992-993 (1961) for extensive case citation on the nature of the private plaintiff's cause
of action.
47. The Government is bringing civil suits for double damages under the False Claims
Act, 12 Stat. 696 (1863), 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-33 (1958), and for compensation under § 4a of
the Clayton Act, supra note 6 (1955 amendment allowing Government a cause of action
for actual damages). See, e.g., Civil Complaint No. 29379, United States v. General Elec.
Co., filed E.D. Pa., March 14, 1961 (on file in Yale Law Library).
48. A sampling of Supreme Court cases reveals the range of materials which can
be used in determining what matters were previously adjudicated: Sealfon v. United
States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) (evidence at trial and instructions to jury); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 256 U.S. 70 (1921) (record) ; Radord v. Meyers, 231 U.S. 725 (1914) (opinion) ;
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683 (1895) (findings and con-
clusion) ; Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876) (extrinsic evidence).
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sources can reveal the outer limits of the prior judgment, the extent to which
it was an adjudication of the details of the charged offense rather than of some
unidentified acts violating the relevant statute.49 One result is that the scope
of the estoppel depends as much upon how the indictment is drawn and what
evidence is adduced as it does upon the nature of the offense itself.50 To some
extent, therefore, the prosecutor can control the scope of the judgment's
subsequent estoppel. Limiting this control is the tactical necessity of framing
an indictment which will maximize the likelihood of conviction.
Two conceptual difficulties result from an attempt to estop a defendant
from denying particular overt acts after he has pleaded guilty to a Sherman
Act conspiracy indictment alleging those acts. An overt act (in addition to
the agreement) is not an essential element of a Sherman Act conspiracy, thus
allegations of such acts in the indictment could be regarded as surplusage, not
covered by the defendant's plea of guilty.5' Secondly, when an indictment in-
cludes enumerated terms, purposes, acts, or results, and conviction could be
sustained by the establishment of some but not all of the enumerated items, a
judgment before trial on a plea of guilty is not an adjudication of any particu-
lar one of the alleged items.52
49. Emich v. United States, 340 U.S. 558 (1951), illustrates estoppel technique. A
treble-damage plaintiff sought to introduce a government-obtained judgement under § 5.
The heart of his case was that cancellation of his dealer-franchise had resulted from re-
fusal to finance his sales through General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Emich intro-
duced the judgment against G.M. showing a conspiracy to limit interstate trade in respect
to monopolizing auto-financing. The Court of Appeals, 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950), found
the judgment inadmissible to show that coercion of dealers was one of the means employed
in the conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the finding of coercion against
dealers was firmly rooted in the criminal conviction and that it could therefore be intro-
duced as prima facie evidence under section 5, thus easing Emich's proof problems on the
cause of the franchise cancellation. In determining the reach of estoppel, the Court coun-
seled lower courts to "examine the record, including the pleadings, the evidence submitted,
the instructions under which the jury arrived at its verdict and any opinions of the courts."
Id. at 569. Emich is well explored in Notes, 62 YA=E L.J. 417 (1952), 65 HARv. L. REv.
1400 (1952), 46 ILL. L. REv. 765 (1951).
50. See, c.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 127 F. Supp. 907 (D. N.J. 1955)
in which the court suggests that it is a matter of interpretation whether any particular act
is an essential characteristic of a conspiracy or one of the means used to effectuate it. In
Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948), the Court looked partly to the "facts ad-
duced at trial" to determine estoppel.
51. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1918); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). See generally on Sherman Act conspiracies, Rahl,
Conspiracy and the Anti-Tru.st Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950) ; Note, 13 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 434 (1948) ; Note, The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy, 54 CoLuM. L. REv.
(1954).
52. United States v. American Packing Co., 113 F. Supp. 223 (D. N.J. 1953), United
States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D. N.J. 1955), United States v.
Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959). Since these three cases struggle with interpreting a
plea of guilty to conspiracy in a subsequent suit predicating liability on the plea, they are
of particular interest, and because so apposite will be much cited in subsequent documenta-
tion. In each case, the Government was seeking to recover damages in a civil suit follow-
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These difficulties, however, do not foreclose the possibility of estopping a
party from denying a substantial portion of the details of an indictment to
which he has pleaded guilty.5 3 A defendant by pleading guilty admits a specific
offense, not just commission of a type of crime generally.5 4 An indictment,
moreover, must go beyond the general statutory prohibitions and charge an
offense in specific terms.55 Thus, a Sherman Act indictment cannot charge
solely in terms of the statute "a conspiracy in restraint of trade in electrical
equipment," but must "descend to particulars" about the act or agreement.'
How far an indictment must "descend" is a question courts are constantly,
variously and somewhat inarticulately, deciding when Sherman Act indictments
ing a criminal conviction for a conspiracy to file false claims against it. In order to show
damages, the government needed proof of the specific acts originally alleged as part of
the conspiracy. The courts categorically refused to read the criminal indictments so broadly.
Rather, they took the view that:
The specification of illegitimate activities appended to the bald charge of conspiracy
may be considered in the nature of a bill of particulars, advising the accused of the
acts upon which the Government bases its denunciation.
United States v. American Packing Co., supra at 224. Since only one overt act was neces-
sary to prove the conspiracy and the indictment had alleged many such acts, neither all nor
any particular one had been proved.
If the same indictment were to go to trial, the scope of the estoppel resulting from the
judgment might be expanded because the prosecution might choose to present proof of
but one of the enumerated items or the defendant might not contest some of them. See,
e.g., United States v. Sealfon, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). But it is doubtful whether even after
trial the defendants could be bound by a judgment, insofar as independently sufficient
enumerated items were concerned, if evidence has been adduced as to more than one of the
listed items, and if the defendant had contested all the issues toward which Government
evidence had been directed (or, at least the item on which it is later sought to estop him).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 250 (1940).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), United States
v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). When the defendants in subsequent suits
denied that their guilty pleas covered certain acts, the court simply found that they had
pleaded to all important allegations in the indictment (important not necessarily meaning
inaterial). Neither case, however, involved conspiracy where the dichotomy between the act
of agreement and the acts done in pursuance thereof is clear enough to make courts reluc-
tant to go beyond the statutory language defining the conspiracy. See cases cited at note
45 supra. Moreover, in the Bower and Schneider cases, the main issue was liability for a
statutory forfeiture rather than proof of damages. Refusing the defendant the right to
deny portions of the indictment to which he had formerly pleaded guilty did not directly
affect the liability issue, since the Government needed no proof of specific acts on which to
base damage claims. See, also, the court's craftsmanship in interpreting the meaning of a
guilty plea in United States v. Wainer, 211 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1954).
54. But, of course, the conspiracy as charged means the admission of that particular
conspiracy in its essential nature, else the pleading defendants could not later plead
double jeopardy to another indictment of the same nature ....
United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 127 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D. N.J. 1955).
55. United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
56. Frankfort Distilleries v. United States, 144 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd, United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
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are challenged as to sufficiency.5 7 The decisions agree, however, that some
details describing the conspiracy must be set forth. In United States v. Armour
& Co.,58 for example, the court said that though a paragraph charging that the
"defendants continuously for a period of ten years knowingly engaged in a con-
spiracy ... to fix prices of hogs in Oklahoma City market in restraint of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act" would be "insufficient to charge
the offense with the definiteness and clarity required by law," the next two
paragraphs saved the indictment. Allegations in the first of these paragraphs
included:
defendants ... purchase equal number of hogs each year and each month
in the aforesaid livestock market; defendants divide . . . shipments
equally between themselves and pay identical prices for the hogs in the
shipments so divided; . . . defendants regulate their Saturday buying of
hogs in the aforesaid market on a reciprocal basis; ... defendants threaten
to cease purchasing hogs from commission firms selling to other buyers
of hogs... and in other ways obstruct and impede the lawful buying and
selling liberties of such commission firms . .. ."
The second of the paragraphs sets forth a number of overt acts done to
"effectuate the conspiracy."5 9
Generally, the sufficiency of a conspiracy indictment is measured by its
success in defining the nature of the conspiratorial agreement, in enabling °the
defendant to prepare his case, and in protecting the defendant from double
jeopardy.60 Courts, of course, vary in their decisions on sufficiency. But the
one uniform standard is that the indictment must charge a particular crime
with particular attributes.6 1 One does not plead guilty, therefore, to conspiracy
in the air, but rather to a specific, though perhaps tacit or inferred, agreement
between specific parties to do specific things during a specific period. A
conspiracy between A, B, and C is not identical to nor proved by evidence of
a conspiracy between A and B: a conspiracy to do X, Y, and Z is not a
conspiracy to do X and Y only; nor is a conspiracy from T 1 to T2 identical
to a conspiracy from T 1 to T3 or vice versa. It may be that if a defendant goes
to trial on a conspiracy indictment, his conviction will be sustained notwith-
57. Compare United States v. Safeway Stores, 57 F. Supp. 448 (D. Kan. 1943) with
United States v. Erie County Malt Beverage Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP., (1957 Trade Cas.) f1
68590 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1957).
58. 137F.2d269 (10th Cir. 1943).
59. Other cases have held sufficient indictments charging no more than the paragraph
Armour suggests was insufficient standing alone. See, e.g., United States v. Erie County
Malt Beverages Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) If 68590 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25,
1957).
60. Frankfort Distilleries v. United States, 144 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1944) (citing
numerous cases).
61. Courts often speak of the necessity to outline in the indictment the particular plan
of the defendants-whether it was to divide markets, fix prices, coerce others to join a
price-fixing association. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Blouse, Shirt and Neckwear
Contractors Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.), If 69454 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1959).
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standing variances in the proof such as those suggested above. 2 But the
flexibility of the law of variances should not alter the fact that one who pleads
guilty to an indictment before trial pleads guilty to the offense described in the in-
dictment and not to some variation thereof which might have been established
at trial.
Whether details in an indictment are "essential" to the charge is a matter
which ultimately rests on the interpretation of the indictment by the court
deciding the estoppel question. 3 Having nothing to guide it except the prior
judgment, the indictment, and the plea, such a court must be heavily in-
fluenced by the terminology employed in the indictment. In two recent cases,
for example, courts which narrowly restricted the scope of estoppel of guilty
pleas to conspiracy indictments suggested that their decisions would have been
broader had the indictments been framed differently. In United States v.
Guzzone,64 the Government, following a criminal conviction for conspiracy to
file false claims, brought a civil suit to recover $2000 statutory forfeitures
under the Surplus Property Act. When the Government sought to introduce
the criminal indictment and plea of guilty as conclusive of nine overt acts,
the court refused this construction, saying in part:
The indictment further alleged that in pursuance of said conspiracy the
defendants committed nine overt acts, each of which had to do with one
or more named veterans.
No substantive counts were included in the indictment. The defendants
were not charged with unlawfully obtaining surplus trucks, but with
conspiracy to cause the veterans to file false statements [footnoting the
statute]. The pleas admitted this and estopped the defendants from
denying it in the government's civil action. Whether or not the veterans
purchased trucks and transferred them to defendants (although admis-
sible evidence in the criminal trial) was not necessary to establishment
of the conspiracy charged and allegations that they did so were super-
fluous. 5
62. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). The problem here was that one
conspiracy was alleged and two proved. Only one involved the defendant; the Supreme
Court held this variance not prejudicial. See generally Note, 57 CoLua!. L. REv. 387 (1957).
63. The court's task could be compared to that of the court passing on the sufficiency
of the Sherman Act indictment. Both must decide what allegations are necessary to define
the particular conspiracy. But the similarity is superficial, as exemplified by the complete
reversal of the defendant's position in the two cases. The defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the indictment seeks to have the conspiracy defined in explicit detail while
the defendant in an estoppel case would argue that only the most general charging terms
were necessary to define the conspiracy. What in fairness to defendant would be sufficient
to allege a conspiracy which he could defend against might be considerably more than
would be necessary to define a specific crime for estoppel purposes. On the other hand,
the language in some cases passing on sufficiency which indicates that very little description
is necessary does not mean that much description is surplussage or extraneous. Other rea-
sons, such as the availability of a bill of particulars, may influence the court's holding
sufficient an indictment with few specifics.
64. 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959).
65. Id. at 123. (Emphasis added.)
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This language indicates that if the criminal indictment had incorporated the
actual acquisition of trucks as part of the conspiracy, the defendant's guilty
plea might have estopped their denial of acquisition. But even if the indict-
ments had been framed as the court hints, this would not solve the problem
of which overt acts were admitted when nine were charged and only one was
necessary for conviction. United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co.66 pro-
vides a possible guide for drawing a multi-overt acts indictment:
If... the bribery allegation is but . . .one of the many 'means . . .ef-
fectuating the conspiracy,' the plea does not constitute an admission of
his bribery ... if the bribery ... alleges one of the essential character-
istics of the indictment pleaded to ... the plea would have admitted it.
67
Other dictum in the same case draws a line between acts set out as actually
having effectuated the conspiracy and those which "could also be read as
simply characterizing the illegal plan which defendants had in mind, as
distinguished from the effectuation of such plan . *"8... s The implication is
that acts alleged "as part of" an effectuated conspiracy would have estoppel
value not otherwise given. To the extent that these various ways of expressing
details conform to the actual conspiracy, the terminology of the indictment
rightly persuades the court. Unfortunately, but inevitably, the court which
has no other means for defining the scope of the prior judgment cannot
with certainty distinguish the artful from the accurate indictment.
The difficulty of interpreting a former judgment without the aid of a trial
record 00 and the realization that guilty pleas frequently result from considera-
tions extraneous to the actual guilt of the defendant 70 may also lead courts
66. 127 F. Supp. 907 (D. N.J. 1955).
67. Id. at 910.
68. Ibid.
69. There may be hesitancy as well as difficulty in applying estoppel on the basis of
pleas rather than trial of the issues. The rationale of estoppel is intimately tied to its salu-
tary effect in preventing re-litigation of issues already fought out. Scott, Collateral Estop-
pcl by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 3 (1942); cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68,
comment i (1942). This is especially true of collateral estoppel which, unlike res judicata,
applies only to matters actually determined and not to those which might have been litigated.
Courts may feel that a guilty plea is not a "litigation" of any issues; and though it might
be appropriate for res judicata since there was an opportunity to litigate, the plea is less
suitable for estoppel purposes. But cf. cases cited at note 51 supra. Analogous are cases
holding that collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments since no issues have
been litigated. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 94 N.H. 8, 45 A.2d 218 (1946).
70. Typical e.'planations of why defendant pleaded guilty appear in Minasian v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 9, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936) (advice of counsel and desire to dispose of
criminal case speedily) and Gillespie v. Modem Woodmen of America, 101 W. Va. 602,
133 S.E. 333 (1926) (pleaded guilty to lesser violation to avoid risk of conviction on plea
of not guilty to greater offense).
Legislative recognition that failure to defend against a criminal charge does not
necessarily mean the defendant is guilty may be inferred from laws which make former
convictions of traffic violations inadmissible in damage actions related to the violations.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. A N. § 169.94(1) & (7) (1941). In such cases defendants might
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basing estoppel on only an indictment and a plea to take a restrictive view.
Thus, in the electrical cases, the courts could easily follow the few cases
which have already passed on the scope of conspiracy guilty pleas, 71 and hold
the companies estopped only as to the statutory definition of the crime al-
leged in Paragraph 9.72 A court which desired to hold defendants estopped
more broadly, however, could reasonably define the conspiracy only by refer-
ence to the terms set out in Paragraph 10. This paragraph alleges a number
of different conspiracies, 73 against different classes of consumers ;74 proof of
any one of the elements would have been sufficient for a conviction. But a court
seeking a common sense definition of the particular conspiracy involved in the
relevant case, rather than any conspiracy in general, might be willing to estop
defendants from denying the allegations of this paragraph. Certainly, it is
doubtful whether any court would grant the estoppel effect to the particular
acts and results alleged in Paragraphs 12 and 13.
But different considerations come to bear on the question of what scope
guilty pleas should have as common law admissions. In both severity of impact
and doctrinal rationale, admissions differ radically from estoppel. An admis-
sion may be rebutted while estoppel forecloses any further discussion of the
matters covered. Moreover, admission doctrine focuses on the plea as defend-
ants' statement rather than the jiudgment as the statement of a third party.75
As defendants' voluntary statement, there is no reason why the plea should be
legally incapable of embracing matter more extensive than that on which estop-
pel would be given. Defendant's presence in the second courtroom affords him
an opportunity to counter that which the plea is deemed to cover, and to bring
forth any considerations, other than actual guilt, which influenced the plea.
Thus, no rigid notion of essentiality is necessary to insure opportunity to liti-
gate all issues.
often prefer pleading guilty and paying a small fine rather than litigating to the utmost
in the magistrates' court. See Warren v. March, 215 Minn. 615, 11 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1943).
But cf. Indo v. Woodbury, 8 N.Y.2d 165 (1960). A possible analogy might be drawn to the
anti-trust cases where the criminal sanctions are relatively insignificant but the trials are
expensive and time-consuming.
It was pointed out in Note, 50 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1940) that:
A plea of guilty, ostensibly more convincing proof of guilt than a conviction after
trial, may often be made by one who is able to obtain acquittal but is induced by
extrinsic circumstances to capitulate
citing REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE CRIIfE CoIMfISSION 129-32 (1927), FULLER, CRIIINAL
JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA 85 (1931), CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 236 (1927), MISSOURI
CRIME SURVEY 276 (1926).
71. See note 52 mupra.
72. See text at note 45 mipra.
73. "1) To fix and maintain prices; 2) To allocate . . . the business of supplying
circuit breakers to ... government agencies; 3) To submit ... rigged bids ... ." See text
at note 45 supra.
74. Industrial users, Federal Government, private utilities, and municipalities. Ibid.
75. See, e.g., Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938);
Wesnieski v. Vanek, 99 N.W. 258, 260 (1904).
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Since the effect of an admission varies so profoundly from that of estoppel,
the task of the court differs in justly defining the conspiracy. A defendant
who has pleaded guilty should be held, for common law admission purposes, to
have admitted all the allegations of the indictment. Under this rule, the
guilty plea in the electrical cases, for example, would be held to be admissions
embracing the specific meetings and other material in Paragraphs 11 and 12.76
Defendants could then introduce motions to strike improper allegations which
they made when they pleaded guilty, or exculpatory statements,7 7 as well as
other evidence tending to disprove the truth of the whole or any part of the
indictments. But the introduction of the pleas alone would be sufficient to
shift to the defendants the burden of going forward with evidence.
This procedure would probably increase the frequency of plaintiff recovery
in treble damage actions, 78 which would not be an undesirable result. Though
the treble damage suit is the only potentially effective deterrent to many types of
antitrust violations, 79 plaintiff recovery in the past has been infrequent and
insubstantial."0 Many courts have recently lowered barriers to recovery by
eliminating such defenses as "passing on," "pari delicto" and "unclean hands,"
and by reducing plaintiff's burden of proving with "certainty" a direct and
proximate "causal relationship between violation and damages." 8' In the
context of these judicial developments it is reasonable to adopt a procedure
which reduces the initial burden of third party plaintiffs claiming injury from
a formally admitted conspiracy, but which does not deny defendants the oppor-
tunity fully to litigate any issue.
76. See note 45 supra.
77. These pleas of guilty, are not, of course, an admission of all the allegations of
the indictment; they are made to terminate what would otherwise be a most protract-
ed and expensive litigation.
Counsel for General Electric, Transcript, supra note 1, at 393.
What limitations a pleading defendant may impose upon subsequent use of the plea
will be a question raised by the introduction of these statements. A possible analogy is the
rule which makes judgment on a plea of nolo contendere a conviction for "second offender"
statutory purposes. Almost by definition, pleading nolo is an attempt to limit any subsequent
effect of the plea. Yet conviction on a nolo plea is counted a prior offense in many juris-
dictions. See, e.g., People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934). The fact of judg-
ment and all elements necessary to the fact may be beyond the defendant's power to limit
or deny.
78. But cf. Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble-Damage Suitors, 61 YAIE
L.J. 417, 425 (1952) which suggests that unless the prior judgment is admitted as con-
clusive evidence, the private litigant's lot remains unhappy.
79. See, e.g., Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Piller of Antitrust, 3 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 167 (1958); Comment, Increasing Control Over Corporate Crime-A
Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280,288-290 (1961).
80. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1059 (1952) ; Bicks, The Department of Justice
and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959).
81. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 32
(9th Cir. 1960) (citing cases). For analysis, see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 469, 477-78 (1961) ;
ABA, AN ANTITRUST HAND3OK 578-80 (1958). See also, Clark, The Treble Damage
Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicH. L. REv. 363
(1954) ; Note, 61 YA.E L.J. 1010 (1952).
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